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Abstract
The U.S. Tax Program for Swiss Banks is a very significant part of the recent history of
the Swiss financial industry. It has accelerated the transformation of the Swiss banking
industry from a system that relied on bank secrecy to a much more compliant one. It
was also rather costly for the banks involved. This short paper tries to identify the
determinants of the individual penalties that were levied by the DoJ.
Keywords: tax evasion, bank secrecy.
JEL classification: G21, H26.
1 Introduction
In August 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Swiss Federal Department
of Finance issued a joint statement that created the U.S. Tax Program for Swiss Banks
(“the program”). This program paved the way for ending the conflict that had emerged
between the two countries concerning Swiss bank secrecy (DoJ and EFD, 2013).
At the time, the DoJ had collected evidence that several Swiss banks had syste-
matically helped U.S. tax subjects to evade taxation. By that time, several Swiss banks
were already under criminal investigation by the DoJ. The largest of these banks, UBS,
had settled in 2009 and received a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) in exchange
for full cooperation with the DoJ, including providing names of clients and employees,
and a penalty of USD 780m. One bank (Wegelin) collapsed in 2012 as a consequence of
the conflict with the DoJ. Six major banks (Credit Suisse, Bank Julius Bär, Pictet, HSBC,
Zürcher Kantonalbank and Basler Kantonalbank), and eight smaller banks had also been
charged but had not yet settled at the time of the creation of the program. Other banks
were at risk of being implicated in the DoJ’s investigation. The whole Swiss banking
industry appeared to be under siege.
International pressure on Swiss bank secrecy had already been mounting for some
time. Before the U.S. came into play, there had been a series of initiatives led by the
OECD to increase transparency and induce cooperation among countries on taxation.
With respect to bank secrecy, the OECD tried to establish the free exchange of information
between tax authorities, or ideally the automatic exchange of information on tax subjects.
This amounts to abolishing bank secrecy for tax purposes. The strategy of the OECD
relied mainly on blacklisting non-cooperative jurisdictions, thereby hoping that this public
shaming would prove effective. In successive negotiations between Switzerland and the
EU, a withholding tax on interest income was introduced, and the distinction between tax
evasion and tax fraud was removed, thereby easing the way for an EU tax authority to
request information on bank accounts in Switzerland about which they were suspicious.
However, in all these negotiations, bank secrecy itself was fully preserved.
Delaloye, Habib, and Ziegler (2012) use this period of prolonged negotiations to
estimate the value of bank secrecy for UBS and CS (the two largest international universal
banks in Switzerland) and two large Swiss private banks (Julius Bär and Vontobel). They
extract the effect on the stock prices of these banks that is due to particular events
connected to the negotiations. The only event that has a negative effect on UBS and CS
was a letter by EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein published in the Financial Times. The
authors interpret this letter as hinting towards possible sanctions and loss of access to the
EU financial market. Two other events related to the introduction of the withholding tax
affected the two private banks, but not the large universal banks. The authors conclude
that bank secrecy was of significant value only for the two private banks, whereas its
value for the two international universal banks was zero. These banks feared loss of
market access much more, and might therefore have been in favor of abolishing bank
secrecy in order not to jeopardize market access.
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Emmenegger (2017) asks the question of why bank secrecy, having been well esta-
blished for decades in Switzerland, ultimately fell.He argues essentially that the Swiss
state depends on the viability of the large international banks, and these banks depend
on access to the U.S. financial market. By threatening to deny these banks access to this
important market, the United States was able to force the Swiss government to agree.
Having publicly admitted to wrongdoing, Switzerland was then unable to withstand
reform, also vis-à-vis other jurisdictions.
We do not find this argument completely convincing. It is obvious that access to
the U.S. financial market is vital, but it is not obvious that access to the EU financial
market is less vital. So why was the U.S. so much more successful than the EU in its
handling of Switzerland? We are not legal or political science scholars, but it is interesting
that the EU was negotiating with the Swiss government, whereas the DoJ was attacking
Swiss corporations. Its first target was the biggest bank in the country, no less. This is
in line with the guidelines set by the DoJ with respect to charging corporations: “[. . . ]
corporations are likely to take immediate remedial steps when one is indicted for criminal
conduct that is pervasive throughout a particular industry, and thus an indictment often
provides a unique opportunity for deterrence on a massive scale [. . . ]” (Holder, 1999,
Section I.B). It is conceivable that this strategy was far more effective than the shaming
and negotiating strategy of the OECD and the EU. We agree with Emmenegger (2017)
about the aftermath of the program: after it was publicly established that Swiss banks
had helped customers to avoid taxation, it was impossible to keep bank secrecy alive.
The program is a significant part of recent Swiss financial history. It contains
material for scholars of law, political scientists, historians, and, of course, economists. The
aim of this short paper, however, is not to analyze the long-term effects of the program,
but is much more mundane. We simply study the determinants of the penalties that
were paid by category 2 banks. We find that there are five determinants. First, the
most important variable determining the fines is the maximum U.S. related assets under
management. This finding is in line with the formal definition of the program. Second,
the DoJ lists particular types of behavior it found in the participating banks. We find a
few such behaviors that prove valuable in explaining the penalties. Third, the average
assets under management per account is also an important determinant. Banks with the
same assets under management but whose assets belonged to a larger number of smaller
clients paid larger penalties than if the bank had fewer, but larger, clients. Fourth, we
find some evidence that the solvency of the banks at the end of 2013 may have played a
role as well. Banks that had a low leverage ratio (i.e. high levels of capital compared to
their balance sheets) received higher penalties than banks that were less solvent. Fifth,
the DoJ seems to have eased the fines as the program evolved. Controlling for the other
variables, we find that the fines for the banks that settled last were significantly smaller
than the ones that settled early. We have no indication why this is the case.
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2 Basics of the Program
Participation in the program was voluntary, and some banks indeed opted not to partici-
pate. The program allowed the industry to resolve the U.S. tax issue in a structured and
relatively predictable manner. The last paragraph of the DoJ Tax Division’s comment on
the program makes this very clear:
“Each eligible Swiss bank should carefully weigh the benefits of coming forward,
and the risks of not taking this opportunity to be fully forthcoming. A bank that
has engaged in or facilitated U.S. tax-related or monetary transaction crimes
has a unique opportunity to resolve its criminal liability under the Program.
Those that have criminal exposure but fail to come forward or participate but
are not fully forthcoming do so at considerable risk.” (DoJ Tax Division, 2013,
p. 4)
The first step for a participating bank is to request permission from the Swiss
Federal Department of Finance to participate. Such permission is necessary because
cooperating with a foreign government to the extent required by the program without
prior permission constitutes a breach of Art. 271 Abs. 1 of the Swiss penal code.1 In July
2013, the Finance Department published a model request for banks to apply for such
permission (EFD, 2013).
The second step is for the banks to declare their willingness to participate in the
program by submitting a Letter of Intent (LOI). The deadline for this was December 31,
2013. The program divided the banks into four categories, and banks have to indicate to
which category they want to belong.2 Category 4 banks are financial institutions with
local client bases who are deemed compliant. Category 3 banks are banks that are not
category 4, but who have not committed tax-related or monetary transactions offenses
against U.S. law. Category 2 is for banks that are not Category 1 but have reason to
believe they may have committed tax-related offenses. Category 1 are banks that were
already under criminal investigation (the aforementioned fourteen banks). These banks
are excluded from the program.
Category 3 and 4 banks have to provide evidence for their classification, which is
then verified by an independent examiner (at the expense of the bank). In exchange, the
bank is offered a non target letter (NTL), which is essentially just a document stating
that the bank is not, at that time, the target of any criminal investigation authorized by
the DoJ’s tax division.
Category 2 banks are the focus of the program. Banks that fulfill the requirements
of the program are offered a non-prosecution agreement (NPA). An NPA is very similar
to a DPA. In both cases, the bank is not convicted of any crime and does not formally
1The law is intended to protect Swiss sovereignty and forbids official activities on Swiss soil to the benefit
of foreign countries. See Husmann (2014) for a critical view of the approach that was used by the Swiss
government to allow banks to cooperate.
2The deadline for the LOI of category 3 and 4 banks was later extended to December 31, 2014, see DoJ
Tax Division (2014).
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admit guilt, but full cooperation and typically the payment of a penalty are required.3
The process and the obligations of category 2 banks are explained in the next section in
greater detail.
All category 2, 3, and 4 banks have in the meantime settled with the DoJ and have
received NPAs or NTLs. Some category 1 banks, however, have not yet settled. Two of
these banks have been liquidated in the meantime (Bank Frey and Neue Zürcher Bank).
According to DoJ data, the category 1 banks that have settled so far had an aggregate
maximum amount of assets under management (AuM) belonging to U.S. clients of USD
38bn. They have paid penalties of about USD 4.4bn. The category 2 banks had in total
maximum assets under management belonging to U.S. clients of roughly USD 50bn and
have, in sum, paid penalties of USD 1.37bn.4 Other Swiss (non-bank) companies are also
under investigation or have been charged and have settled similar disputes with the DoJ.
For instance, the wealth management company Prime Partners in Geneva is a family
office, not a bank. They received an NPA in exchange for full cooperation (e.g. naming of
clients) and a penalty of USD 5m.5 Since Prime Partners is not a bank, the program was
not open to them and this paper does not include such cases.
3 Category 2
In order for a bank to be granted an NPA, it has to fulfill three obligations. It must
provide detailed information, it must provide assistance to the DoJ in implicating other
individuals, and it must pay a penalty. The process is explained in detail in DoJ and EFD
(2013) and DoJ Tax Division (2013).
Information: The bank must disclose the total number of U.S. related accounts, as well
as the maximum balance on these accounts for three periods: on August 1, 2008, between
August 1, 2008 and February 28, 2009, and after February 28, 2009.
In addition, the bank must provide information about the amount and form of the
transfer of funds into and out of the account during the applicable period. In particular,
it must show where the funds came from and where they went to (i.e. identification
of intermediary or financial institution and its domicile). This information is clearly
intended so that the DoJ is able to follow the money and implicate other institutions or
individuals.
The bank must identify further its internal procedures for the handling of U.S.
clients and accounts. This information includes the names of employees involved in
acquiring, operating, and supervising such accounts. In particular the names of the
3In a DPA, charges are filed with a federal court but are dismissed after all obligations have been fulfilled.
In an NPA, no charges are filed with a federal court, see Alexander and Cohen (2015).
4The largest individual penalty for a category 2 bank was the USD 211m that was paid by BSI, a bank
that has in the meantime been implicated in the 1MDB case and has been sold (https://www.finma.ch/en/
news/2016/05/20160524-mm-bsi/).
5DoJ press release number 17-910 of August 15, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/acting-
manhattan-us-attorney-announces-agreement-swiss-asset-management-firm-resolve-criminal
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relationship manager, client advisor, asset manager, financial advisor, trustee, fiduciary,
nominee, attorney, or accountant at any time during the relevant period have to be
submitted. The information also includes internal reporting and communication with
management on such matters.
The above information has to be verified (at the expense of the bank) by an indepen-
dent examiner.
Assistance: Interestingly, the bank does not disclose the identities of the U.S. account
holders themselves. Doing so would violate Swiss bank secrecy law. However, upon
request, the bank will provide testimony and assist the United States in any criminal
proceedings. In particular, the bank provides all information necessary for the United
States to draft treaty requests to seek account information.
Furthermore, the banks will close all non-compliant U.S. related accounts. They will
also prevent their employees from assisting U.S. account holders with further concealment.
Moreover, the banks will open new U.S. related accounts only if they can ensure that the
account will be declared to the United States and will be subject to disclosure by the Swiss
bank. This effectively terminates Swiss bank secrecy for U.S. customers vis-à-vis the U.S.
government for category 2 banks.
Penalty: The program specifies a formula for computing the penalty:
“Upon execution of an NPA, the Swiss Bank will agree to pay as a penalty:
1. for U.S. Related Accounts that existed on August 1, 2008, an amount
equal to 20% of the maximum aggregate dollar value of all such accounts
during the Applicable Period;
2. for U.S. Related Accounts that were opened between August 1, 2008, and
February 28, 2009, an amount equal to 30% of the maximum aggregate
dollar value of all such accounts; and
3. for U.S. Related Accounts that were opened after February 28, 2009,
an amount equal to 50% of the maximum aggregate value of all such
accounts.
The determination of the maximum dollar value of the aggregated U.S. Related
Accounts may be reduced by the dollar value of each account as to which the
Swiss Bank demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the Tax Division, was not an
undeclared account, was disclosed by the Swiss Bank to the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service, or was disclosed to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service through
an announced Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program or Initiative following
notification by the Swiss Bank of such a program or initiative and prior to the
execution of the NPA.” (DoJ and EFD, 2013, section II.H)
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Note that the penalties are rather steep. They are between 20% and 50% of the maximum
aggregate amount that was in these accounts. This is certainly more than the profit the
banks made with these accounts, and very likely more than the tax that was evaded. Of
course, not all U.S. accounts were undeclared, and it is in fact likely that many U.S. clients
were tax compliant. However, the burden of proof that some of these accounts were in
fact declared to the IRS lies with the banks.
Even though the program prescribes a rigid formula for the penalty, the DoJ clearly
had some degree of freedom in determining the fines. On the Tax Program website, they
state: “It is indeed essential to remember that banks receive a rebate if, for example,
they managed to push clients into the IRS voluntary disclosure program. Furthermore,
extraordinary cooperation might play a role in reducing the fine as well. It follows that a
low penalty could be an indication that the bank had very little undeclared U.S.-related
assets or that the institution closed undeclared accounts early in the time period of the
U.S. Tax Program, or that a lot of its U.S. clients participate in a voluntary disclosure
program initiated by the bank, or even that the bank strongly cooperated with the DoJ.”
(see http://www.ustaxprogram.com/penalty-statistics/, emphases added).
4 Data
Initially, 87 banks were in category 2. Nine of those6 subsequently left the program or
switched to a higher category, so 78 banks remained in category 2 and went through with
the process. The DoJ provides the individual NPAs and summary data for all the 78
banks that remained in category 2 on the website http://www.ustaxprogram.com/banks/
(see also https://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program).
According to the program as described in the previous section, the penalty is a
function of the maximum amount of assets under management (AuM) in three different
periods, minus some potential rebate for extraordinary cooperation. This hypothesis
cannot be tested, however, because the DoJ has not published the AuM for the individual
banks and the three periods separately. For most participating banks, they only publish
the maximum AuM over all three periods together. The DoJ has also published the
maximum number of U.S. related accounts for each bank. According to the program, this
data should not affect the penalty. Interestingly, the DoJ was careful to document this
information for each bank. This leads us to believe that it did play a role in some way.
We will argue that the average assets per account, AuM/accounts, is a useful explanatory
variable.
The NPAs describe in some detail the DoJ’s findings concerning the activities of
each bank relevant to allowing or helping customers avoid taxation. We have collected
30 such practices, see Table 1. The practices range from rather benign behavior, such as
“e-banking, retail and private banking services for U.S. clients” (A24), to much more dubi-
ous actions, such as “assisted in the falsification of documents” (A3). We will experiment
6Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Lloyds Banking Group, Banque Morval, BC Fribourg, BC Genève,
Barclays Bank (Suisse), Barclays Capital, Zürich Branch of Barclays Bank London, VP Bank (Schweiz).
6
Table 1: Activities of banks as described by the DoJ. Ax is the code used in the regression
tables. The number in square parentheses is the number of banks that are assigned this
activity in the DoJ findings.
with different collections of these activities as regressors to find a combination that helps
explain the penalties.
Finally, we have collected balance sheet data for as many banks as possible for the
year 2013. In particular, we have collected the size of the balance sheets, capital, earnings,
and profit of 60 banks. For 18 banks — all specializing in private banking7 — we do not
have access to annual reports.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the data. The penalty, assets, number of
accounts, and average account size data are extremely skewed. The logarithmic versions
of those variables are more symmetrically distributed. In order to avoid the results
being dominated by the banks with the largest penalties, most AuM, and most or largest
7Lombard Odier, Coutts, HSZH Verwaltungs AG, Gonet, Bordier, Baumann, Banque Pasche, Standard
Chartered Bank, PBZ, Finter Bank Zürich, Reichmuth, BHF-Bank, E. Gutzwiller, Société Generale Pri-
vate Banking (Lugano-Svizzera), Arvest Privatbank, Leodan Privatbank, Credito Privato Commerciale,
Bellerive.
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Table 2: Some descriptive statistics (penalties and AuM in million USD; capital and
balance sheet in million CHF).
accounts, we will mostly work with logarithmic data. One bank did not have to pay a
penalty (Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni (Suisse) SA), so this bank is
dropped from our sample as well.
Figure 1 depicts more detailed information about the data in order to assess selection
effects when dropping the private banks for which no balance sheet data are available.
The chart provides kernel estimates of the main variables for the subset of banks that are
in the sample with balance sheet data, and the ones that are excluded from this sample.
Visual inspection suggests that there is not a great difference between the two samples,
except with respect to average account size. The excluded private banks had significantly
larger accounts than the other banks.
5 Results
As stated in the program, the determinants of the penalty are the maximum aggregate
assets under management in U.S. related accounts. The difficulty is that the program
distinguishes between three points in time, namely August 1, 2008, between August 1,
2008 and February 28, 2009, and after February 28, 2009. However, the data published
by the DoJ for most participating banks do not distinguish these three periods; only
the maximum over the three periods is published. Moreover, the penalty is levied only
on those assets that were unknown to the IRS at the time the program began, but the
published data does not reveal the share of assets that were shown by the bank to be tax
compliant. As a consequence, our model is necessarily miss-specified.
Category 2 banks held, according to the DoJ data, about USD 50bn U.S. assets
under management (AuM). If all these assets were not tax compliant, the total penalty
would have to be between 20% and 50% of this value, that is, between USD 10bn and USD
8
Figure 1: Distributions (kernels) of some data. The solid lines are for the 60 banks for
which we have balance sheet data; the dashed lines are for the 18 banks for which we do
not.
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Table 3: Regression results.
25bn. Yet, the penalties were only USD 1.37bn, which is between 5.5% and 13.7% of the
values we would expect if all AuM were non-compliant. Therefore, apparently, the banks
were unable to establish tax compliance for 5.5% and 13.7% of their AuM, or vice versa,
between 86.3% and 94.5% of the assets in Category 2 banks were indeed tax compliant.
Despite the unavoidable miss-specification, a regression
pi =β0+β1 ·AuMi+εi, (1)
where pi is bank i’s penalty, is a start. If the complete AuM had evaded U.S. taxation,
βi should be between 0.2 and 0.5, according to the definition of the program. In Ta-
ble 3, column 1, we report that this coefficient is only 0.02, which is consistent with the
assessment we made before that the major part of the AuM were indeed tax compliant.
To account for the highly skewed distribution of the data, we will use the logarithmic
specification of (1). Note that now the coefficient β1 should be 1 according to the definition
of the program, because the relationship between AuM and penalty ought to be linear,
hence exhibiting unit elasticity. Table 3, column 2, reports that β1 is indeed close to unity,
though statistically slightly smaller.8
8One bank is dropped from the sample because its penalty was zero.
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We now add the activities, as identified by the DoJ in the individual NPAs, as
explanatory variables. If we add these activity dummies individually to equation (2),
activities A4, A9, A19, A20, and A24 turn out to be significant at the 5% level. If we use
these five dummies simultaneously, A20 and A24 lose their significance. We therefore
keep the remaining three activities in the regression,
log(pi)=β0+β1 · log(AuMi)+β2 ·A4+β3 ·A9+β4 ·A19+εi. (4)
The results are reported in Table 3, column 3. The coefficients of the activities are all
positive, indicating that banks that did pursue these activities did face larger fines.
As reported, the DoJ carefully collected and reported the number of U.S. related
accounts, despite the fact that the number of accounts is not a determinant of the penalty
according to the definition of the program. However, the (logarithmic) number of accounts
indeed turns out to have a statistically significant explanatory power,
log(pi)=β0+β1 · log(AuMi) · · ·
+β2 ·A4+β3 ·A9+β4 ·A19+β5 · log(accounts)+εi. (5)
Table 3, column 4 reveals one unsatisfactory feature of this specification, though: the
elasticity of AuM with respect to penalties is clearly not 1 anymore. According to the
program, there should be a linear relationship between these variables, and thus the
elasticity should be unity. We can remedy this shortcoming by not using the number of
accounts per se as a regressor, but the average size of the accounts, AuM/accounts,
log(pi)=β0+β1 · log(AuMi) · · ·
+β2 ·A4+β3 ·A9+β4 ·A19+β5 · log(AuM/accounts)+εi. (6)
Table 3, column 5 shows that this reestablishes the unit-elasticity of AuM. We will argue
below (Section 6) that there is a good reason to assume that the size of the accounts held
at the banks contains important information about the ability of the banks to establish
the tax compliance of their customers, and this affected the penalty the banks ultimately
had to pay.
We also consider a quadratic specification of the size-variable in Table 3, column 6
and find that it is superior to the linear specification.
Table 3, column 7 is the same specification, but using only the sample of banks for
which we have accounting data (which will be used in the following regressions). The
differences are small and give us no indication of important selection effects.
One might wonder if the ability of banks to pay penalties might have played a role
as well. There is no mention of this in the program, but as a general principle, one purpose
of criminal law is the “deterrence of further criminal conduct” (Holder, 1999, Section II.B),
and this can only be achieved if the fine is to some extent painful for the corporation. We
therefore check whether some basic bank balance sheet data help to explain the size of the
11
Figure 2: Contributions of the exogenous variables (regression version 14).
fines. First we control for the size of the bank, measured by balance sheet or by capital,
Table 3, columns 8 and 9 respectively. We find that both variables have no significant
influence. Next we measure the ability of the bank to pay by its solvency, simply measured
as the share of capital in relation to the size of the balance sheet. We add plain solvency
as well as its logarithmic version as regressors, Table 3, columns 10 and 11. Solvency has
the expected positive coefficient and, interestingly, turns out to be significant at the 10%
level.
Finally, note that it took the DoJ about ten months from the first to the last NPA for
category 2 banks. The first NPA was issued on March 30, 2015, the last on January 26,
2016. It is possible that the DoJ changed its stance as time went by. Indeed, adding the
date of the NPA as a regressor produces a statistically significant negative coefficient, see
Table 3, columns 12 and 13. So it appears that, controlling for everything else, the DoJ
set smaller fines towards the end of the program than at the beginning. The date of the
NPA is measured in years, and the variable varies from 0 for the first NPA to 0.83 for
the last. The coefficient of −1.2 therefore induces a difference of −1.2 ·0.83≈−1.0 from
the first to the last NPA. A logarithmic difference of this size amounts to exp(−1.0)≈ 1/3.
This means that the fines toward the end of the program were reduced to about a third of
the size of those at the beginning. It is not possible to know whether this is a reflection
of an evolving policy of the DoJ, whether there were personnel changes that led to this
changed behavior, or whether the DoJ chose to deal with the “hard cases” about which
12
they suspected more wrongdoing first (without this being fully captured by our activities
dummies), and hence demanded higher fines.
The last specification, Table 3, column 14, is the same as specification 13, except
that we have now dropped activity A19, which is no longer significant. As a result, the
solvency variable and the quadratic account size variable gain some significance, but
otherwise the results are quantitatively almost unchanged.
Figure 2 depicts the parts of the individual (logarithmic) penalties that are explained
by the components of version (14) of the regression.9 AuM is clearly the dominant factor,
as it should be, given the rules of the program. However, the average size of the accounts
also contributes, in some instances significantly. The same applies to the two activities
(A4 and A9). Solvency and the date of the NPAs appear to contribute comparatively less.
6 The size variable and the role of solvency
We have found that the average size of the accounts and the solvency of the bank has a
statistically significant and economically meaningful effect on the fines the banks had to
pay. We now discuss possible reasons for these effects.
To understand why the average size of the accounts should have had an effect on
the penalty, let us consider two banks that paid similar penalties, but had very different
compositions of accounts. The (logarithmic) mean of the AuM per account across all banks
in our sample is USD 0.83m. Migrosbank reported USD 273m U.S. related AuM, and
898 such accounts. This makes USD 0.3m per account on average, which is significantly
smaller than the average across all banks. Migrosbank paid a fine of about USD 15m.
According to our estimate (regression (11)), if Migrosbank’s accounts had been equal to
the average USD 0.83 million, its fine would have been only USD 7.3m, which is only
half of what it paid. Compare this to Rothschild Bank. This bank reported USD 1,500m
U.S. related AuM in 332 accounts. This makes USD 4.5m per account on average, so
the account balances of Rothschild’s clients were much larger than those of the average
bank. Rothschild Bank paid a smaller fine than Migrosbank, namely USD 11.5m, despite
having much more U.S. related AuM. If it had had the average account size, its penalty
would have been much larger, namely about USD 74.4m according to our estimate.
It is possible that large clients were on average more tax compliant than small
clients, or maybe it was easier for Rothschild Bank to push its larger clients into voluntary
disclosure and establish the tax compliance of these accounts, while Migrosbank was not
able to do so for its smaller clients. It is, unfortunately, not possible to test this hypothesis
because the amount of delinquent AuM is not available.
About the significance of solvency, one possible argument for the influence of this
variable is that the DoJ wanted to avoid sending a bank into bankruptcy by charging
too large a fine. On closer inspection of the data, this reasoning appears unconvincing,
9More precisely, the bars indicate the contributions for an individual bank minus the average contribution
over all banks: for example, contributionAuM(i)= 1.2004 · [log(AuM(i))−mean(log(AuM))]. For the activities
dummies, we do not correct for the sample average: contributionactivities(i)= 0.5310 ·A4(i)+0.4996 ·A9(i).
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Figure 3: The penalties had a minimal effect on the solvency of most banks. Solvency is
measured as capital divided by the size of the balance sheet. “Before penalty” means the
balance sheet data of the bank as reported in the 2013 end of year annual report. “After
penalty” subtracts the penalty (in CHF, using the end of year exchange rate of 1 USD =
0.8929 CHF) from capital, and divides again by the balance sheet.
however. Figure 3 plots the capital ratios of the category 2 banks at the end of 2013, and
the capital ratios that would have resulted if they had had to pay the fines at that moment.
The fines were quantitatively much too small compared to the capital of the banks to
have a pronounced effect on their solvency. The DoJ could have imposed much harsher
fines without jeopardizing any of the banks. Some category 2 banks did go out of business
during the program,10, but this was not due to its becoming insolvent because of the size
of the fine. The reason, then, why the solvency variable turns out to be statistically and
economically significant, remains unclear.
10Credito Privato Commerciale SA voluntarily went out of business in June 2012, but still received
an NPA and paid a fine in July 2015. Banca della Svizzera Italiana (BSI) was purchased by EFG In-
ternational in 2016, after losing its license in Singapore “for serious breaches of anti-money laundering
requirements, poor management oversight of the bank’s operations, and gross misconduct by some of
the bank’s staff” (http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2016/MAS-directs-BSI-
Bank-to-shut-down-in-Singapore.aspx).
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7 Conclusion
The program spelled out a rule for determining the penalties. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to verify that this rule was applied because the DoJ has not published the
data in the necessary detail. For instance, the NPAs do list the maximum assets under
management related to U.S. entities. However, for most banks, the DoJ does not publish
when these accounts were in operation (which, according to the program, has an influence
on the penalty), and how much of the AuM was shown by the banks to be tax compliant.
Our analysis suggests that, overall, between 86% and 95% of the U.S. assets in Category 2
banks were tax compliant. With the available data, we do find strong evidence that the
amount of U.S. related assets under management has a strong positive influence on the
fines, as is to be expected.
The DoJ has collected and published relevant practices that banks were engaged
in. We identify a small number of such activities that seem to help explain some of
the variance in the fines. The activities we identify have to do with allowing customers
to withdraw cash anonymously, or helping them conceal their accounts from U.S. tax
authorities.
Furthermore, we find that banks with many small accounts paid larger fines than
banks with few, but large, accounts. It is not completely clear why this is so. It is possible
that larger clients were more tax compliant on average than smaller clients, or it is
possible that the banks had more difficulty in proving tax compliance for many small
clients compared to few large clients.11
In addition, we do find some tentative evidence that the DoJ imposed higher fines on
well-capitalized banks. It is not possible to determine whether this was by design or not.
It is unlikely that avoiding driving a bank into a solvency crisis was a major consideration
for the DoJ; the fines were simply too small for that. However, it is possible that the DoJ
felt that it could and should extract more from a well-capitalized bank. Yet, it is also
possible that this statistical result stems from the necessarily miss-specified model.
Finally, we find evidence that the DoJ over the course of the program significantly
reduced the fines. Banks that settled later received a better deal than banks that settled
earlier. Again, it is not possible to know whether this was the intention of the DoJ, whether
its policy gradually evolved over time, or whether this is connected to the sequence the
DoJ set at the outset when it decided to prioritize some dossiers at the expense of others.
In conclusion, it is notable that the sums that have been transferred from the Swiss
banks in categories 1 and 2 to the U.S. government are substantial. So far, these banks
have paid USD 5.8bn in fines. In addition, the legal cost for the banks must have been
very high as well. There are no publicly available data on that, but a legal conflict that
lasts several years for high stakes and that involves U.S. law enforcement is bound to
be expensive. Moreover, U.S. tax subjects that were identified by the program were also
prosecuted and were billed for taxes and fines, although no final account of these payments
11In fact, the DoJ has acknowledged the difficulty that banks faced in demonstrating tax compliance, and
has in the process extended the deadline for providing such evidence, see DoJ Tax Division (2014).
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is publicly available.12 The U.S. government made a hefty gain from the program. On
the other hand, the program has allowed the Swiss banking industry to leave the conflict
behind in a structured and relatively quick fashion. The financial legacy that still remains
today is several category 1 banks which are still awaiting a settlement.
More broadly, the program has paved the way towards the fall of Swiss bank
secrecy with respect to a wide array of jurisdictions. As of today, Switzerland has signed
agreements to exchange information automatically about foreign customers of Swiss
banks with 41 jurisdictions. The Swiss banking industry has been permanently changed
by this program.
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